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Privacy in German Employment Law
By ROBERT G. SCHWARTZ, JR.*
' I. INTRODUCTION1
In technologically advanced countries, employers collect enormous
amounts of information about their employees. Seeking to measure and
stimulate efficiency in their factories and offices, modem managers devise
new ways to monitor their employees' behavior and performance at
work. Seeking to minimize their exposure to unforeseen financial and
safety risks, managers also demand information about their employees'
lives at home. And with computers, they can combine this information,
analyze it exhaustively, and produce a composite picture of an em-
ployee's abilities, value to the company, and unique personal characteris-
tics. The computer has revolutionized the personnel office.
American legislators slowly are reacting to these developments.
Congress is currently considering a bill, tentatively named the "Privacy
for Consumers and Workers Act," that is intended, by its own terms, "to
prevent potential abuses of electronic monitoring in the workplace."'
The Act would strictly regulate the collection, storage, analysis, and re-
porting of any information concerning an employee or job applicant that
could be identified or associated with that person. Because a final version
of the bill has not yet emerged, an exposition of the bill's specific provi-
sions is not yet possible. The fundamental aim of the proposed Act, how-
ever, is clear: employees and applicants would receive written notice
whenever an employer engages in electronic monitoring;3 employers
would be permitted to collect only data that are relevant to work per-
formance;4 disclosure of the information gathered would be strictly lim-
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Ronald R. Lagueux, Federal Judge for the District of
Rhode Island. Associate, Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, Boston, Fall 1992. J.D., 1991, Harvard
Law School; B.A., 1987, Amherst College.
1. All translations are by the author unless otherwise noted.
2. H.R. 3340, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); HMR. 1218, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); S.
516, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also Bills to Curb Electronic Monitoring Abuses Intro.
duced by Simon in Senate, Williams in House, 43 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-9 (lar. 5,
1991). The bill was introduced to the House Committee on Education and Labor and the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources on February 28, 1991.
3. H.R 3340, § 3; H.R. 1218, § 3; S. 516, § 3.
4. H.R. 3340, § 5(a); H.R. 1218, § 5(a); S. 516, § 5(a).
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ited;5 and the use of the data for performance evaluations would be
restricted.6 Massachusetts is considering a similar bill,7 and a handful of
other states already regulate some forms of electronic surveillance in the
workplace.'
Aside from these recent developments, however, American law-
particularly federal law-offers little privacy protection to workers. Fed-
eral employees have enjoyed limited protection again,;t disclosure of per-
sonal information to outsiders since 1974.9 The use of lie detectors in the
workplace has been generally restricted since 1988.10 The Americans
with Disabilities Act of 19901 prohibits pre-employment medical screen-
ing and severely restricts the uses of medical tests after an employee has
been hired. But these existing laws have a limited scope and fail to ad-
dress the emerging problems associated with electronic collection of data
in the workplace.
West German workers, in contrast, have enjoyed national protection
against electronic monitoring at work for almost two decades. 2 If a
German employer wishes simply to install electronic time-clocks, federal
law provides a mechanism for employees to prevent the installation. 3
German employees also substantially control the kinds of information
their employers may demand from them, how it is collected, how it is
used, how long it is kept on fie, and who may see it. National and state
"data protection" legislation provides a comprehensive system regulating
almost all uses of personal information in Germany. And although Ger-
man constitutional jurisprudence previously had lagged behind the
United States in developing a basic right of privacy, Germany's highest
court took the lead in 1983, when it interpreted its constitution to pro-
vide a right to "informational self-determination." 4 This right enables
5. H.R. 3340, § 5(b); H.R. 1218, § 5(b); S. 516, § 5(b).
6. H.R. 3340, § 6; H.R. 1218, § 6; S. 516 § 6.
7. MA H.B. 5569, Massachusetts 177th General Court (1991) Act Relative to Electronic
Monitoring; see also Diane E. Lewis, Monitoring orSpying?, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 21, 1991, at
20; Tina Cassidy, Monitoring Electronic Surveillance: Bill Would Require Employees to be
Told, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1991, at 21.
8. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48b (1990) (prohibiting the use by private employers of elec-
tronic surveillance devices in employee rest rooms, locker rooms, and lounges); Wis. STAT.
§ 230.86 (1989-90) (prohibiting state employers from taking disciplinary action based on infor-
mation acquired, among other means, by unauthorized electronic surveillance); see generally
Don't Pry, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 1990, at 18.
9. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
10. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988).
11. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1991).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 150-209.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 179-205.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 81-113. In the German civil law system, judicial
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Germans not only to prevent official intrusion into their most personal
thoughts and domains, but also to control how the information is used
after it has been surrendered.
15
The manner in which German employment law addresses privacy in
the workplace is worth understanding because German law, in its
strengths and weaknesses, provides a model for critiquing and revising
the existing American system.
Part II of this Article explains the three major sources of privacy
law governing German private workplaces' 6-data protection statutes,
constitutional doctrine, and labor law-and how they interact. Part HI
addresses specific issues involving privacy in the employment relation-
ship, such as medical testing, fetal protection policies, and employee
questionnaires.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF DATA PROTECTION
STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AND
LABOR LAW
A. The Federal Data Protection Act
Germany's first Federal Data Protection Act 7 became effective in
February 1977. This statute regulated the storage, communication, mod-
ification, and erasure of "personal data" (personenbezogene Daten) to
protect against "misuse" by natural persons, private or public organiza-
tions, or their agents."8 The Act defined "personal data" as "details on
the personal or material circumstances of an identified or identifiable nat-
ural person."19
decisions are not technically a source of legal authority, and they only bind the parties in-
volved. But judges are expected to interpret the written law and fill gaps. Judgments, espe-
cially those of the highest courts - such as the Federal Constitutional Court - have strong
persuasive authority and are, for all practical purposes, a defacto source of law. See TIMOTHY
KEARLEY & WOLFRAM FISCHER, CHARLES SZLADrW' GUIDE TO FOREIGN LEGAL MATERI-
ALS: GERMAN 15 (2d ed. 1990).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 81-113.
16. This Article discusses only laws affecting employees in the private sector.
17. Gesetz zum Schutz vor Milbrauch personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenver-
arbeitung (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz-BDSG), [hereinafter Old BDSG], 1977 Bundesgesetzblatt
[BGBI.] 1 201; (amendments reported at 1980 BGBI. I 1469, 1986 BGBI. 1 265). For an Eng-
lish translation, see LAW ON THE PROTECTION AGAINST MISUSE OF PERSONAL DATA IN
DATA PROCESSING (FEDERAL DATA PROTECTION LAw-BDSG) GEsErz ZUM SCHUTZ
VOR MIBIRAUCH PERSONENBEZOGNER DATEN (Ursula Gliss ed. & trans, 1977).
18. Old BDSG §§ 1, 22(2), 31-40 (1977).
19. Id § 2(1); see also KARL FITTING, BETRIEBSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ HANDKOM-
MENTAR 1020 (16th ed. 1990).
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Data protection was a response to the computer revolution 20 and the
dramatic changes in the management of social information in the 1960s
and 1970s.2 1 The legislation attempted to protect the "private sphere"
(Privatsphdre) of each member of German society.22 Germany has been
at the forefront of data protection legislation. As one observer explains,
West Germany was "both the country of origin of the term 'data protec-
tion' (Datenschutz), and, more to its credit, the birthplace of data protec-
tion legislation, if only in the form of a local law enacted by the state of
Hesse in October 1970. "123 At the national level, the ruling coalition that
same month declared its intention to enact federal legislation along simi-
lar lines.24 The coalition eventually proposed a federal data protection
law to the Bundestag (Parliament) in 1973, but the bill languished in
committees and the Bundesrat (the upper national legislative body com-
posed of representatives of the states, or Ldnder) until a "compromise
measure" emerged as law in 1977.25
In December 1990, a new Federal Data Protection Act supplanted
the 1977 version, taking effect in July 1991.26 Like the original statute,
the 1990 statute was a product of compromise between the major coali-
tions in the Bundestag and Bundesrat, and a disappointment to many of
the more progressive reformers.27 This statute also regulates the storage,
communication, modification, and erasure of "personal data," which are
defined again as "details on the personal or material circumstances of an
identified or identifiable natural person." 28
In the 1977 version, private entities that process personal data were
treated generally the same as public entities.29 The 1990 statute altered
this balance. The new Federal Data Protection Act strengthened the re-
20. Eckhardt K. Gouras, The Reform of West German Data Protection Law as a Neces.
sary Correlate to Improving Domestic Security, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 597, 597 (1986).
21. HANDLEXIKON ZUR POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT 72 (W. Mickel ed., 1986).
22. Id.; see also GONTER SCHAUB, ARBErrSRECHTSHANDBUCH 1003 (1987).
23. Gouras, supra note 20, at 600. The first state data protection law was the Hessisches
Datenschutzgesetz, reprinted in 21 SAMMLUNGSBLATr FOR RECHTSVORSCHRIFTEN DES
BUNDES UND DER LANDER 2113 (1970).
24. SPIROS Slmrris ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ 53 (3d ed.
1981).
25. J. Lee Riccardi, The German Federal Data Protection Act of 1977: Protecting the Right
to Privacy? 6 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 243, 247-48 (1983).
26. Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Daten Verarbeitung und des Datenschutzes [herein-
after BDSG], 1990 BGB1. 1 2954. Unless otherwise noted, all references in this Article to the
Federal Data Protection Act are to the 1990 version.
27. See Stefan Walz, Das neue Bundesdatenshutzgesetz: Kompromi, als Leitprinzlp, 7
COMPUTER UND RECHT 364 (1991).
28. BDSG § 3(1).
29. See Old BDSG §§ 7-21.
[Vol. 15
German Employment Law
strictions on permissible uses of personal data by public entities,3° while
making only superficial changes in the structure of the statute's sections
concerning private entities.31
The Federal Data Protection Act does not control in many jurisdic-
tions, and its influence may no longer be dominant. Numerous other
federal statutes contain miscellaneous privacy provisions, and although
German federal law normally overrides state law,32 the Federal Data
Protection Act, by its own provisions, is only binding if other legislation
does not regulate the particular data processor.33 State laws have largely
replaced the Federal Data Protection Act, adding even stricter protec-
tions.34 Nonetheless, the principles of the federal statute continue to re-
30. BDSG §§ 12-26(1990).
31. See Walz, supra note 27, at 365.
32. See I INT'L ENCYCL COMP. L.: NAT'L REP. F-I, F-4 (1973); Riccardi, supra note 25,
at 269.
33. BDSG § 1(4); Old BDSG § 45; see also SiMrrIs, supra note 24, at 1151; FrrrNG,
supra note 19, at 1019; Gouras, supra note 20, at 600. Note that state laws only preempt the
federal law when they provide more, not less, protection for individual rights.
Other federal laws controlling the uses of personal data include: (a) Gesetz fiber die Statis-
tik flu Bundeszwecke [statistics law] [BStaG] § 12, 1953 BGBI. 11314, amendments reported
at 1974 BGBI. 1469, 1987 BGBI. 1 462, 565; (b) Gesetz fiber das Kreditwesen [credit law] § 9,
1976 BGB1. I 1121; (c) Gesetz fiber das Postwesen [post law] §§ 5-6; (d) Fernmelde-
anlagengesetz [telecommunications law] §§ 10-11; (e) Sozialgesetzbuch, Buch I § 35; () Straf-
prozelordnung [criminal procedure] §§ 52-55, 161; (g) Strafgesetzbuch [criminal code] § 203;
(h) ZivilprozeBordnung [civil procedure] § 383-84; (i) Abgabeordnung §§ 30, 102, 105, 140-
48; (J) Bundeszentralregistergesetz [federal central records law] §§ 19, 23, 27, 31, 37, 39-47,
49, 58, 1984 BGBl. I 1229, amendments reported at 1984 BGBI. I 1654, 1985 BGBL 11953;
(k) Personenstandsgesetz [marital status law] § 61; (1) Gesetz fiber das Verwaltungsverfahren
der Kriegsopferversorgung [war victims assistance law] § 36, 1976 BGBI. I 1169;
(m) Bundesbeamtengesetz [Federal civil service law] § 90; (n) Arbeitsf-orderungsgesetz, §§ 20,
22, 1965 BGBI. I 582, amendment reported at 1976 BGBI. I 581;
(o) Reichsversicherungsordnung [insurance law] § 1325; (p) Angestelltenversicherungsgesetz
[civil servants' insurance law] § 104; (q) Reichsknappschaftsgesetz [miners' guild law] § 108h;
(r) Stral enverkehrsgesetz [federal traffic law] § 30; (s) Stralenverkehrs-Zulassungs-Ordnung
§ 13a; (t) Grundbuchordnung [land registry law] § 12 & part II; (u) Handelsgesetzbuch [Com-
mercial Code] §§ 38-40, 42-47; (v) Datenschutzver~ffentlichungsordnung [DSVertYO], 1977
BGBI. I 1477; (w) Datenschutzgebfihrenordnung [DSGebO], 1977 BGBI. I 3153;
(x) Datenschutzregisterordnung [DSRegO], 1978 BGB. 1 250; (y) Melderechtsrahmengesetz
[MRRG], 1980 BGB1. I 1429, amendment reported at 1983 BGBI. 1179; (z) PaBgesetz [PaG],
1986 BGBI I 537; (aa) Gesetz fiber Personalausweise, 1986 BGBI. I 548; (bb) Gesetz zur
Durchfiihrung einer Representativstatistik fiber die Bevblkerung und den Arbeitsmarkt
(cc) Gesetz fiber eime Volks-, Berufs-, Gebiude-, Wohnungs- und Arbeitsstittenzihlung [Volk-
szfihlungsgesetz 1987], 1987 BGBL 1 2078; (dd) Fahrzeugregisterordnung [FRV], 1987 BGBI.
I 2305; (ee) Verordnung fiber das Fernmeldewesen [Telekommunikationsordnung], 1988
BGBI. 1495; (if) Kirchengesetz fiber den Datenschutz [EKD-Datenschutz - EKDDSG], Nov.
7, 1984; (gg) Anordnung fiber den kirchlichen Datenschutz [KDO], Dec. 5, 1977.
34. Gouras, supra note 20, at 600; Riccardi, supra note 25, at 269. For a complete
collection of the data protection statutes of the eleven West German Ladnder, see
BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ MIT VERORDNUNGEN, LANDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZEN,
1992]
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flect the developments in data protection law throughout the country and
throtghout Europe.35 Federal data protection law will provide the only
applicable rules in the former East German Ldnder until state laws are
enacted there. And when the European Commission announced a pro-
posed Directive for a Community-wide data protection law in June 1990,
the proposed European Community law's similarities to the German fed-
eral statute were striking.36
Both the old and new Acts have some limitations. The original
Data Protection Act did not specifically refer to the employment rela-
tionship, and the 1990 Act makes only occasional reference to employ-
ment. 37 Nevertheless, the law is regularly applied in the employment
context, 38 and authoritative commentators leave no doubt about the cor-
rectness of this application.39 The 1977 version of the Act also conspicu-
ously failed to regulate the collection of personal data,'" and the 1990
law, while nominally addressing the collection of data,4" does not regu-
KIRCHENGESETZEN UBER DEN DATENSCHUTZ UND WEITEREN VORSCHRIFrEN (2d ed.
1988) [hereinafter BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ MIT VERORDNUNGEN]. The citations to
these statutes are: Baden-Wirttemberg, 1979 Gesetzblatt [GB1.] 534, 1982 GBI. 265; Bayern
(Bavaria), 1978 BayRS 204-1-I; Berlin, 1978 Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt [GVBI.] 1317,
1983 GVBI. 1562, 1984 GVBI. 31, 1981, GVBI. 71, 1986 GVBI. 3; Hessen, Hessischcs Daten-
schutzgesetz, reprinted in 21 SAMMLUNGSBLATr FOR RECHTSVORSCHRIFTEN DES BUNDES
UND DER LANDER 2113 (1970), 1986 GVBI. 309; Niedersachsen, 1978 Nieders. Gesetz- und
Verordnungsblatt [GVBI.] No. 30, 421, 1985 GVBI. 192; Nordrhein.Westfalen, 1988 Gesetz-
und Verordnungsblatt f'dr das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [GV NW] 160; Rheinland-Pfalz,
1978 GVBI. 749, 1987 GVBI. 57; Saarland, 1978 Amtsblatt [Abl.] 581, 1983 Abl. 35; Schles.
wig-Holstein, 1978 Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt ftir Schleswig Holstein [GVOBI.] 156, 1985
GVOBI. 158.
35. Gouras, supra note 20, at 600; Riccardi, supra note 25, at 269.
36. Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of individuals in relation
to the processing of personal data, 1990 O.1. (C277) 3. The proposed Directive would take
effect in January 1993. See also John Markoff, Europe's Plans to Protect Privacy Worry Busl-
ness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at Al, ("The team that put this directive together was en-
tirely German").
37. BDSG § 28(2)1(b).
38. See, eg., Judgment of Mar. 17, 1987, Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Supreme Labor
Court, First Senate], 54 Entscheidungen des Bundesarbeitsgerichts [BAGE] 278, 287 (F.R.G.);
Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, BAG, 53 BAGE 226 (F.R.G.); Judgment of July 11, 1985,
Landesarbeitsgericht Baden Wiirttemberg [Land Labor Court of Baden Wiirttemberg], 7 Sa
97/84 (F.R.G.), reprinted in 2 COMPUTER UND RECHT 737 (1986).
39. Simms, supra note 24, at 682; FrITING, supra note 19, at 1019.
40. See Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, 53 BAGE at 230 ("Das Bundesdatenschutzgcsctz
regelt nicht die Erhebung personenbezogener Daten"); see also Maria Knott, Inhalt und
Schranken des Rechts auf 'Informationelle Selbstbestimmung' nach dem Urtell des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Volkszdhlungsgesetz, in DATENVERARBEITUNG UND PERSON-
LICHKEITSSCHUTZ, 45, 50 (Max Vollkommer ed., 1986).
41. BDSG § 1(2).
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late such collection byprivate entities.42 Of course, collection of informa-
tion is arguably pointless if storage and communication are prohibited.
Employers could, however, potentially use non-functioning surveillance
equipment in order to make workers believe that they are actually being
monitored or could watch employees through surveillance equipment
without recording the images. While such practices would not violate
the Federal Data Protection Act, one German labor court has ruled that
the presence of videocameras on a factory floor, regardless of whether
they are actually used, violates constitutional rights of employees, who
may believe that they are under surveillance.43
The Data Protection Act prohibits any storage, communication,
modification, or erasure of personal data that is not expressly permitted
by the Act or another law or that is done without the affected individ-
ual's express, written consent.' Under the Act, any person is entitled to
learn from any source about the content, purpose, origin, and destination
of any stored information about him or her.4" Individuals must be in-
formed when a private establishment stores data concerning them for the
first time, unless they have gained knowledge of such storage by other
means.' Except in limited circumstances,4 7 individuals may demand an
account of stored information48 and may correct any errors.49 If the
entity holding the data cannot prove that the information is accurate or
that the original reasons for storing the data still apply, then the entity
must block the challenged data from further processing or
transmission.50
Private companies lawfully may store personal data only when
either (1) processing the data serves the purpose of maintaining a "con-
tractual relationship" or "quasi-contractual relationship of trust," (2)
processing is necessary to safeguard justifiable interests of the company,
42. See BDSG § 28; Walz, supra note 27, at 366.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 213-14.
44. BDSG § 4. For consent to be valid, the employee must know how the data will be
used: simply filling out a questionnaire is not a sufficient showing of knowing consent.
ScHAun, supra note 22, at 1005; SiMrris, supra note 24, at 692.
45. BDSG § 6(2), 33-34.
46. Id § 33(2)1.
47. The data may be kept secret when the data concern state secrets or the privacy inter-
ests of a third person, when the data are available from public sources, when the data will be
stored for less than three months and then purged, or when disclosure would substantially
undermine the aims of the entity storing the data and nondisclosure would not harm the af-
fected individual. BDSG § 33(2), 34(4); see also Wolfgang Diubler, Individualrechte des
Arbeitnehmers nach dem neuen BDSG, 7 COMPUTER UND REcHT 475, 477 (1991).
48. BDSG § 34.
49. Id § 35(1).
50. Id § 35(4).
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and no reason exists to suggest that the processing will harm affected
individuals' privacy interests, or (3) the data are taken from generally
available sources.51 As one court obliquely explained the "quasi-contrac-
tual relationship of trust," if "an immediate relationship exists between
the intended collection of the data and its concrete application, so that
the data are necessary for the fulfillment of a concrete contractual pur-
pose," then the storage of protected data meets the statutory require-
ments of section 23 of the old Federal Data Protection Act52 (and the
corresponding requirements of section 28 of the new Act).
In the hiring process, employers may process infbrmation necessary
to choose among several applicants.5 3 This falls under the section 28
"quasi-contractual relationship of trust" exception." But an employer
may request only information that is relevant to the prospective employ-
ment relationship. 5 And the "relationship of trust" exception termi-
nates if the employer decides to reject the applicant.5 6 If the employer
wishes to keep information on file with the expectation of a possible fu-
ture hiring, the unsuccessful applicant must know of and consent to this,
and the applicant may compel erasure of the information at any time.5 7
This "relationship of trust" may also continue for a limited time
after employment has ended. 8 But the Act gives the former employee
the power to require the former employer to destroy the personnel
records, in the absence of a compelling justification to keep them. 9
Private companies may store, modify, or communicate personal data
only when the conditions for data storage are met.60 Employees also
have the right to be informed when their employer passes along personal
information to someone else, including the identity of the entity or per-
son to whom it has been sent.61 Lists of information about groups, how-
ever, may be communicated to others when there is no reason to suppose
that doing so would harm the privacy interests of the affected persons
51. Id § 28.
52. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, BAG, 53 BAGE 226, 233; see al.o SIMis, supra note 24,
at 691.
53. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 1004; SIMrIs, supra note 24, at 694.
54. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 1004; SIMrns, supra note 24, at 692.
55. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 95; SiMms, supra note 24, at 691.
56. SIMms, supra note 24, at 695.
57. Id at 695-96; see also Judgment of June 6, 1984, BAG, 46 BAGE 98 (F.R.G.),
58. SIMms, supra note 24, at 694.
59. See id. at 694-95.
60. BDSG § 28(1); Judgment of May 19, 1989, Landesarbeitsgericht Hamburg [Land La-
bor Court of Hamburg] (F.R.G.), reprinted in 6 COMPUTER UND RECHT 406 (1990). See also
the discussion supra text accompanying notes 51-59.
61. BDSG § 34(1)(1).
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and when the information is limited to names, addresses, telephone num-
bers, dates of birth, occupations, titles, and academic qualifications. 62
Additionally, the Data Protection Act sets up a "Data Commis-
sioner,"'63 an office that has no counterpart in the United States." This
Commissioner (and the equivalent administrators under state data pro-
tection laws) monitors compliance of governmental and private data
processors with the Act.6" Any citizen may address a complaint to the
Commissioner under the Federal Data Protection Act.6
Civil and criminal penalties are available under the Act. Possible
penalties for violations include fines67 and up to two years imprisonment
for violations committed in exchange for payment.68 Before the govern-
ment will prosecute alleged violations of the Act, the offended individual
must file a complaint.69 The German Civil Code7° and Article 34 of the
Basic Law (Constitution) guarantee civil remedies for victims of illegal
data processing.7' Civil damage awards are limited to actual damages
suffered, but when an employee proves a violation of his or her rights
under the Data Protection Act, the private employer has the burden of
showing that the employee's injuries were not caused by the violation.'
Reformers have sought, so far unsuccessfully, to make civil damages in-
dependent of actual harm and to limit insurance coverage for a violator's
liability.73
62. Id § 28(2)1(b).
63. Id. §§ 22-26, 36-38.
64. See Angela Daniel-Paczosa, Data Protection and the Right to Privacy in the United
States and West Germany, 1987 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 154, 161. But legislation was
introduced in the House of Representatives on January 29, 1991, to establish, as part of the
executive branch, a "Data Protection Board" that would develop guidelines and legislation for
implementing the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 522a (1988). See H.R. 685, 102d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1991). This Act is called the "Data Protection Act of 1991," but unlike the German
Act, the proposed American statute contains no substantive rules. The proposed "Privacy for
Consumers and Workers Act" would give the Secretary of Labor power to assess penalties and
to promulgate regulations. H.R. 3340, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 7-8 (1991); H.R. 1218, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 7-8 (1991).
65. See BDSG §§ 22-26, 36-38.
66. Id. § 21.
67. Id §§ 43(1), 44. The statute does not specify the amount of the fines.
68. Id § 43(3).
69. Id § 43(4).
70. Bi'rgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] [BGB] § 839.
71. See Daniel-Paczosa, supra note 64, at 161.
72. BDSG § 8.
73. HANS PETER BULL, ZIELE UND MrrrEL DES DATENSCHUTZES: FORDERUNGEN
ZUR NOVELLIERUNG DE DATENSCHUTZGESETZES 46-47 (1981); see also Dr. Falk Peters,
Bericht aus Bonn: Datenschutz-Hearing, 2 COMPUTER UND REct 308 (1986); Note, DSB-
Konferenz zur BDSG-Novellierung, 5 COMPUTER UND RECHT 558 (1989).
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The Act frequently is criticized for its vagueness and lack of useful
definitions or explanations.74 Soon after the original Act took effect in
1977, it became apparent that the provisions allowing companies to pro-
cess personal data when necessary to safeguard "justifiable interests" 75
left the gates open for a flood of exceptions to the rule. 6 Moreover, the
law does not state who determines the necessity of collecting the data or
who assesses the possible injuries to an individual's privacy interests. 77
The party most likely to make the determination, then, is the one seeking
to store the data.78 The "quasi-contractual relationship of trust" excep-
tion 79 similarly is subject to broad interpretation.80
B. Constitutional Protection of Personal Information
Germany's Constitution, the Basic Law,81 like the American Consti-
tution, does not explicitly address privacy rights.8 2 But the German fed-
eral judiciary, "influenced by the development of a right to privacy in
American tort law, and sensitive to a recent past in which the state con-
trolled all aspects of human existence,"8 3 has inferred its own doctrine of
privacy from a few fundamental constitutional principles.84 In 1948 and
1949, reflecting on their recent troubled history, the authors of the Basic
Law began their document with an inventory of basic rights (Grund-
rechte).,5 The first of these, article one, establishes the individual's right
to protection of human dignity against the State's power (Recht auf
74. Riccardi, supra note 25, at 267.
75. Old BDSG §§ 23, 24(1); BDSG § 28(1)2.
76. BULL, supra note 73, at 7. The 1990 Act leaves these provisions unchanged.
77. The 1990 Act does provide that transmission to third parties of information about a
subject's health, criminal record, religious or political views, or work-related complaints is
presumed to injure the subject. BDSG § 28(2)1(b).
78. Riccardi, supra note 25, at 262.
79. BDSG § 28(1)1.
80. See BULL, supra note 73, at 9.
81. The Parliamentary Council, which drafted the Basic Law in 1948 and 1949, chose the
term Grundgesetz [Basic Law] in order to emphasize the temporary character of the Bonn
constitution. Verfassung, the equivalent of the English word constitution, was reserved for a
united Germany.
82. Article 4(11) of the Constitution of the Land North Rhine Westphalia (Nordrhein-
Westfalen) does, however, contain a data protection provision.
83. Gouras, supra note 20, at 605.
84. See Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG][Federal Constitu-
tional Court], 65 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1, 41 (F.R.G.);
see also DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RE-
PUBLIC OF GERMANY 333 (1989); Wolfgang Teske, Das Recht auf informationelle
Selbstbestimmung in einer sich wandeinden Arbeitswelt, 4 COMPUTER UND RECHT 670, 671
(1988).
85. Grundgesetz [Basic Law] [GG] arts. 1-19.
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Schutz der Menschenwi7rde).86 Article two sets forth the right to develop
one's personality freely (Recht auffreie Entfaltung),87 so long as doing so
does not injure the rights of others or the "constitutional order."' 8 On
separate occasions, the Federal Constitutional Court has identified each
of these as the "highest constitutional value."" 9 Together, they define
what the courts call a "general personality right" (allgemeines Pers'n-
lichkeitsrecht). In 1973 the Federal Constitutional Court ruled thatpri-
vate persons and institutions must also respect the individual's right to
free development of personality.9
One German legal scholar claims that "[i]f no other provision of the
Constitution guarantees one's right to privacy, these two articles taken
together will do so. ' ' 92 The Federal Constitutional Court eventually
reached the same conclusion, but not until long after the Basic Law had
taken effect. In 1969, four years after the U.S. Supreme Court had pro-
claimed in Griswold v. Connecticut that "the First Amendment has a pe-
numbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion," 93 the
German Federal Constitutional Court stressed that the Basic Law pro-
tects an "untouchable sphere of private life withdrawn from the influence
of state power."'  The opinion nonetheless left the scope and conditions
of this right undefined. In the following decade, the growth of privacy
law was confined to developments in data protection legislation.
The German Federal Constitutional Court elevated privacy and
86. Id art. 1(1).
87. Id art. 2(1).
88. Id The Basic Law is designed to protect itself from social forces that seek to destroy
it. So, for example, the Federal Constitutional Court may ban the activities of political parties
that aim to repeal the Basic Law's "free, democratic, basic order." Id art. 21(2); Judgment of
Oct. 23, 1952, BverfG, 2 BVerfGE 1, 1 (F.R.G.). This intolerance of"constitutional enemies"
is a response to the National Socialists' use of the Weimar Constitution to gain power in 1933,
only to repeal the Constitution immediately. See generally WOLFOANG RuDZIO, DAS
PoLrrISCHE SYSTEM DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 30-33 (1983); ef Collin v. Smith,
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.) (the First Amendment prohibits the town of Skokie, Illinois, from
banning a march by the National Socialist Party of America through a predominantly Jewish
neighborhood), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978).
89. Judgment of June 11, 1958, BverfG, 7 BVerfGE 377, 405 (F.RLG.) ("nach der
Gesamtauffassung des Grundgesetzes list] die freie menschliche Persbnlichkeit der oberste
Wert"); Judgment of July 16, 1969, BverfG, 27 BVerfGE 1, 6 (F.R.G.)("In der Wertordnung
des Grundgesetzes ist die Menschenwdirde der oberste Wert").
90. See eg., Judgment of Jan. 31, 1989, BverfG, 79 BVerfGE 256, 268 (F.R.G.).
91. Judgment of Feb. 14, 1973, BverfG, 34 BVerfGE 269, 271-72 (F.R.G.).
92. Daniel-Paczosa, supra note 64, at 155.
93. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
94. Judgment of July 16, 1969, BverfG, 27 BVerfGE 1, 6; see also Riccardi, supra note 25,
at 245.
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data protection law to a constitutional level in 1983. 9" The Bundestag
had unanimously passed an act requiring a national census of the popula-
tion (Census Act).96 Hundreds of citizen initiative groups protested that
some of the questions were overly intrusive,97 leading to a constitutional
challenge in the courts. The Federal Constitutional Court upheld most
of the Census Act's requirements, but it struck down three minor provi-
sions requiring questions that, in the court's view, could identify the
source of the information gathered. 9
The landmark Census Act decision99 established the constitutional
right to "informational self-determination" (informationelle Selbstbestim-
mung). According to the Court, the Basic Law gives individuals the au-
thority to decide for themselves the scope of exposure and the uses of
their personal information. 10° The ruling enshrined the principle that
citizens should be able to learn who knows what about them and to con-
trol how that information is used.' 10
The computer revolution made this interpretation of the Basic Law
necessary. As the Court explained, "Considering the danger involved
[today] in utilizing automatic data processing, the legislature is duty-
bound, more so than ever before, to adopt organizational and procedural
measures designed to safeguard the individual from any infringement of
95. See Gouras, supra note 20, at 597. Earlier, in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that a state's centralized computer database containing citizens' personal medical records does
not violate any constitutional right to privacy. Wahlen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). The
Court's decision, announced in February-coincidentally, the same month in which the first
German Data Protection Act took effect-divides privacy doctrine into two kinds of constitu-
tionally recognized privacy: interests in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and interests
in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. 429 U.S. at 599.600. As long
as the records are administered properly to protect the subjects' confidentiality, the risk of
disclosing the personal information is not great enough to constitute a violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 429 U.S. at 600. Thus, although the Court found that an inter-
est in keeping information private is constitutionally cognizable, it held that the facts in
Wahlen did not amount to a violation.
96. Gesetz fiber eine Volks-, Berufs-, Wohnungs-, und Arbeitsst~ittenziihlung (Census of
1982), 1982 BGBI. I 369; see also Gouras, supra note 20, at 608.
97. Paul Schwartz, The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: Towards
an American Right of Informational Self-Determination, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 688 (1989).
98. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, BverfG, 65 BVerfGE 1, 52-53, 63, 65-66. For an English
translation of the most important passages of the opinion, see KOMMERS, supra note 84, at
333-36.
99. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, 65 BVerfGE 1.
100. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, 65 BVerfGE at 46.
101. See Judgment of July 11, 1985, Landesarbeitsgericht Baden Wfirttemberg (Land La-




his right to personality." ' 2 The Court also emphasized-in language
suggesting that the Court was mindful of conditions at the time in East
Germany-modern technology's dangers to other basic rights:
If someone is uncertain whether information about unusual behavior is
being stored and recorded permanently in computer banks, or does not
know whether it will be used or passed on, he will try not to attract
attention by engaging in such behavior. If he expects that [the state]
will officially register his attendance at a meeting or participation in a
citizen's initiative and [believes] that personal risks might result from
this, this person may refrain from exercising his rights [of association]
(in articles 8 and 9). This would not only impair his chances of devel-
opment but would also damage the common good, because self-deter-
mination is an elementary functional condition of a free democratic
community based on its citizens' capacity to act and to participate.
Because of this, the individual must be protected from the unlim-
ited collection, storage, use, and transmission of personal data as a
condition for free personality development under modem conditions of
data processing.
10 3
A few years later, the Court explained that this right protects generally
against official collection and processing of private information, and it
reaffirmed that the right is based solely on the Basic Law, not on any
data protection statute. 0 4
The right to informational self-determination may be limited, how-
ever, for reasons of "compelling public interest" (i7berwiegendes
Allgemeininteresse), °5 a reflection of the balancing of individual and
public interests contained in the second article of the Basic Law."' 6 If
one person's informational self-determination conflicts with another per-
son's basic rights or creates a public danger, then the public interest
comes first.'0 7 The state retains its ability to track the movement of sus-
pected terrorists, for example. This reservation of state power is not sur-
prising. But "compelling public interest" also includes the power to
102. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, 65 BVerfGE at 44 (translation from KOMMERS, supra
note 84, at 335).
103. 65 BVerfGE at 43 (translation from KOMMERS, supra note 84, at 334).
104. Judgment of Mar. 9, 1988, BverfG, 78 BVerfGE 77, 84 (F.R.G.).
105. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, 65 BVerfGE at 44; see also Judgment of Mar. 9, 1988, 78
BVerfGE at 85 (protection may be limited by "compelling general interests" [tiberwiegende
Allgemeininteressen] that satisfy the principle of proportionality [Verhdltnism6WDgkeit]); Teske,
supra note 84, at 671.
106. Article two sets forth the right to freely develop one's personality, so long as doing so
does not injure the rights of others or the "constitutional order." See supra note 88 and ac-
companying text.
107. See Knott, supra note 40, at 51.
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require HIV carriers to disclose their illness,108 a result that is certainly
more controversial.
The scope of the right to informational self-determination-that is,
which types of information are regulated and how Ihe right applies to
private'actors-is still unclear."0 "Although the [Census Act] decision
'only' applies to a concrete dispute between citizen and state," one ob-
server has noted, "it nonetheless additionally carries complex implica-
tions for all areas of automated information processing in the state and
its society."" 0 Commentators generally agree that the right only pro-
tects "intimate" information, i.e., sensitive information about personal
qualities and preferences."' German courts also have upheld the right
against private parties." 2 A private employer, no less than an overreach-
ing federal government, can use information to intimidate a person into
forgoing his or her bqsic constitutional rights. 113 This argument supports
the apparently prevailing view that the Census Act doctrine should al-
ways apply in the private employment context.
C. Protection of Privacy Through Labor's Participation in
Management
1. Basic Principles of Labor Participation
German workers may influence the conditions of their employment
at four levels." 4 The two most basic levels-and those most familiar to
Americans-are participation in the democratic political process and col-
lective bargaining through trade unions. 15 German employees also par-
108. See infra text accompanying notes 279-82; see also FITTING, supra note 19, at 1225,
Knott, supra note 40, at 55.
109. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 1007; see also Dr. Falk Peters, BOOK REVIEW, 6 CoM-
PUTER UND RECHT 744 (1990) (reviewing WOLFGANG DAUBLER, GLASERNE BELEG-
SCHAFTEN9 DATENSCHUTZ FOR ARBEITNEHMER, ANGEsrELLTE UND BEAMTE (1990)),
110. Teske, supra note 84, at 671.
111. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 1007. For instance, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled
in 1988 that the right to informational self-determination prevents the government's disclosure
of information about a person's legal incapacity or alcoholism. Judgment of Mar. 9, 1988,
BverfG, 78 BVerfGE 77, 84.
112. See, eg., Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, BAG, 53 BAGE 226, 233 (F.R.G.); see also Pctra
Wiesinger, Datenschutz im Arbeitsverhdltnis, in DATENVERARBEITUNG UND PERSON-
LICHKEITSSCHUTZ 169, 187 (Max Vollkommer ed., 1986)[hereinafter Wiesinger, Datenschutz].
113. See Knott, supra note 40, at 61.
114. See Clyde W. Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Com-
parative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AMER. J. CoMP. L. 367, 368 (1980); see gener-
ally MANFRED WEISS, LABOUR LANV AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 149-83 (1987).
115. See Tarifvertragsgesetz [Collective Bargaining Act], 1969 BGBI. 11323. This Article
does not discuss further German employees' power to control working conditions, particularly
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ticipate in corporate governance through worker representation on the
supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrdte) of many private companies. 116 Super-
visory boards meet between two and four times a year to appoint and
supervise management boards (Betriebsffihrung), which are responsible
for day-to-day operations.117 Private limited liability corporations s
(GmbHs) 1 19 and public corporations (AGs) n ° employing more than
2,000 workers must form supervisory boards. 2 ' Finally, German law
provides for the creation of formal, non-union labor councils to represent
employees before management.
A trio of statutes enacted in 1952, 1972, and 1976 determines the
scope of worker representation in management boards. The
Codetermination Act of 1976 (Mitbestimmungsgesetz)I"2 requires that
employee representatives constitute fifty percent of the members of all
supervisory boards for public and private companies that regularly em-
ploy more than 2,000 people."n In 1980, this law affected about 450
enterprises.24 Despite the apparently equal division of voting rights be-
tween equity holders and employees, however, the Act's rules for electing
a board chairman, 2 ' who is chosen by stockholders and who casts the
deciding vote in case of a tie, often guarantee that shareholders retain
privacy interests, through the political process and collective bargaining. These subjects re-
quire an examination of the political struggle between German labor and management, which
is beyond the scope of the present topic.
116. For insight into why American labor still generally opposes works councils, see Du-
Pont's Workplace Groups Challenged, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1991, at B12.
117. Aktiengesetz [Public Corporation Law] [AktG] §§ 111, 171; see also DAVID MARSH,
THE GERMANS: THE PIVOTAL NATIoN 126 (1990).
118. Although Germany's Private Corporation Law [Geseltschaft mit beschrinkter Haf-
tung-Gesetz] [GmbHG] states that a supervisory board is optional for all private limited liabil-
ity corporations, see GmbHG § 52, other federal law--such as section 6 of the
Codetermination Act of 1976 and sections 76-77 of the Works Constitution Act of 1952, dis-
cussed infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text, may require a mandatory supervisory board
[obligatorischer Aufsichtsrat]. See generally II ScHoLZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBH GESETz
1953-55 (7th ed. 1988).
119. Geselschaften mit beschrdnkter Hafiung or GmbHs.
120. Aktiengesellschaften or AGs.
121. AktG § 96.
122. Act Respecting Workers' Codetermination of May 4, 1976 [Codetermination Act],
1976 BGB1. I 1153.
123. Codetermination Act §§ 1(1), 7. Mutual insurance companies, partnerships, the
press, television, and charitable, religious, and ideological organizations are exempted. Id
§ 1(4); see also BUNDESMINISTER FOR AR3EIT UND SOZIALORDNUNG, CODETERMINATION
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 13 (1980).
124. Herbert Wiedemann, Codetermination by Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AMER.
3. COMP. L. 79, 79 (1980).
125. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [Works Constitution Act of 1972] [BetrVG] § 27(2), 1972
BGBI. I 13.
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effective control. 126
The Works Constitution Act of 1952 (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz),t27
meanwhile, requires that employee representatives comprise at least one-
third of the membership of supervisory boards of all corporations-AGs,
limited partnerships (KGs), 128 and GmbHs-employing more than 500
employees. 129 By 1980, the 1952 Act affected approximately 2,000 to
3,000 firms. 130
The new Works Constitution Act of 1972131 requires, in addition to
labor representation on supervisory boards, that employers allow the es-
tablishment of "works councils" (Betriebsrdte) of employee representa-
tives in companies regularly employing more than five full-time
employees. 132 Employees form works councils at their own discretion;
many small businesses lack works councils because their employees have
chosen not to form them. 133 Larger companies with several worksites
may have a works council for each worksite, with a central works council
at the company's place of management.134 Employees elect works coun-
cils from their own ranks, and union membership is not required for par-
ticipation. 135  Unlike the American system of labor participation, in
which representation is consolidated in the majority union, 13 6 German
representation consists of an almost complete division of functions be-
tween the union and the works council. 37 While trade unions represent
126. See Wiedemann, supra note 124, at 80.
127. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [Works Constitution Act of 1952] [hereinafter BetrVG
1952], 1952 BGBI. I 681. The 1972 Act replaced the entire Works Constitution Act of 1952
except the provisions concerning workers' representation on the supervisory boards. The unrc-
pealed sections are BetrVG 1952 §§ 76, 77, 77a, 81, 85, 87. See BUNDESMINISTER FO1t
ARBEIT UND SOCIALORDNUNG, supra note 123, at 10.
128. Kommanditgesellschaften or KGs.
129. BetrVG 1952 §§ 76-77.
130. Wiedemann, supra note 124, at 80.
131. The Works Constitution Act of 1972 [BetrVG], 1972 BGBI. 1 13.
132. BetrVG § 1. For a schedule determining the size of a company's works council-
ranging from one member for companies employing fewer than 20 employees to 31 members
for companies with 9,000 employees-see BetrVG § 9.
133. Wiedemann, supra note 124, at 81.
134. BetrVG § 4; see also PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN GERMANY 78 (1988).
135. BetrVG §§ 1, 2.
136. Some American companies have tried to set up panels of labor representatives that
would be similar to German works councils, but labor unions have opposed them. See Du-
Pont's Workplace Groups Challenged, supra note 116.
137. Summers, supra note 114, at 373. Mr. Summers writes:
The union and the works council are not only legally separate xnstitutions, but in
practical terms often operate substantially independently of each other. It is true that
unions submit lists of candidates for works council elections, and 80% of all works
council members are union members. However, once elected most works council
members consider themselves to be representatives of the workeis in the shop, not
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the labor forces of entire industries and negotiate collective agreements
with management to set standards for all firms, the works councils are
responsible for applying and improving standards within individual
enterprises.
138
The works councils do not represent all employees. They are only
composed of, and accountable to, certain wage-earning and salaried em-
ployees.139 For instance, "executive" staff (leitende Angestellte), those
with the power to dismiss employees, sign contracts, or play other impor-
tant roles in the company management, are excluded from
membership. 140
Works councils represent employees in dealings with management,
primarily to ensure fair treatment under prevailing contracts and labor
law. The works councils meet with employers at least once each
month 141 in order to investigate and prosecute employee complaints, 1 4Z
to serve as agents for notifying workers of certain changes in opera-
tions, 43 and to play a general watchdog role against management.'"
The right of codetermination (Mitbestimmung) is essentially a right to be
informed about most aspects of the employer's operations and to reject
many kinds of employer activities. 45 Professor Paul Weiler explains:
At least in regard to specifically human resource questions-which in-
clude measures to deal with the impact of plant closings or technologi-
cal change - the German works council must give its prior consent to
any management action. When mutual consent is not achieved by the
parties' discussions, an appeal may be taken by either side to binding
outside arbitration.
46
This arrangement's historical roots reach deep into the nineteenth
century. Codetermination theory was well developed before the First
arms or agents of the union. Even though elected on the union slate, they may refuse
to follow union policies, defy union officials, and even present in future elections a
slate of candidates opposing the official union list. (Citations omitted.)
Id
138. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE oF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 293 (1990); see also Summers, supra note 114, at 373.
139. BetrVG §§ 5-6.
140. Id
141. Id § 74.
142. Id § 80(1)[2]-[3].
143. See id. § 90.
144. See id § 80(1)[1].
145. Id §§ 87, 91, 94, 99, 102; see generally Petra Wiesinger, Betriebliche Mitbestimmung
bei der Personaldatenverarbeitung, in DATENVERARBEITUNG UND PERS6NLICHKEITSSCHIfz
195, 198 (Max Vollkommer ed., 1986) [hereinafter Wiesinger, Betriebliche Mitbestimmung].
146. Weiler, supra note 138, at 289-90.
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World War147 and assumed its modern form after the Second World
War. Professor Detlev Vagts writes:
The Nazi experience and the war naturally had a traumatic effect on
the German labor movement. On its postwar revival it was deter-
mined to build a stronger position than ever before; it had as bargain-
ing counters not only the need of industry for sacrifice and discipline
on the part of labor during the reconstruction period but also the sym-
pathy of the Occupation forces, particularly those maintained by the
Labour government in the British zone, which included the Ruhr coal
and steel region. The result was the codetermination law of 1951, as
amended by the holding company amendment of 1956 and the [Works
Constitution Act] of 1952. These statutes, enacted over the protests
and dire predictions of industry, seem now to be an enduring part of
the German scene (citations omitted).148
Codetermination has become such an influential doctrine that the current
reluctance of German workers and trade unions to support a more har-
monized European Community stems in part from fears that the EC will
weaken codetermination. 149
Codetermination gives many German workers a toehold, although
no decisive advantage, in the corporate control of the privacy conditions
in their workplaces. It also gives German workers more specific powers
for protecting their privacy, as the following section explains.
2. The Works Council's Role in Protecting Employees' Privacy
Interests
The Works Constitution Act of 1972 gives works councils limited
powers with which to thwart some means of collecting and analyzing
personal information from employees. These rights are not all stated ex-
147. As early as 1848, when the first national Constituent Assembly met in Frankfurt's
Paulskirche, some representatives unsuccessfully demanded factory committees and worker
participation in management. BUNDESMINISTER FOR ARBEIT UND SOZIALORDNUNCG, supra
note 123, at 9. In 1891, Social Democrats and labor unions strongly opposed a worker partici-
pation proposal by conservative legislators, but the labor movement ultimately changed Its
position. WEISS, supra note 114, at 149. In 1905, a coal strike in the Ruhr led to the establish-
ment of works councils in several mines, and in 1916, military suppliers adopted works coun-
cils in order to prevent disruptions in production. Summers, supra note 114, at 374.
Codetermination first became national law in the early Weimar period in 1920, as the German
trade union movement grew powerful among the ruins of the Kaiser's empire, only to be elimi-
nated entirely by the National Socialists in 1933. Summers, supra note 114, at 375; see
Betriebsritegesetz of 1920 [Works Council Act], 5 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI.] 147 (1920).
148. Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the 'Modern' Corporation: Perspectives from the German,
80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 66 (1966).
149. MARSH, supra note 117, at 199.
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plicitly; most derive from several basic principles of the Act.15° First, the
Act binds the employer and works council to a general duty of good faith
cooperation (Gebot der vertrauensvollen Zusammenarbeit),1' 5 a rule that
implies a duty to share information in most situations tsz Second, an
employer must give the works council any information necessary for car-
rying out the council's duties.15 3 The statute's language--creating a
"comprehensive right to information" (umfassendes Unterrichtungsrecht)
and "access at any time" (jederzeitige Zuverfiigungstellung)--gives the
works council wide-ranging access to necessary information.154 This ac-
cess is limited only by the information's relevance to the council's du-
ties.1  Finally, the Works Constitution Act imposes on both the
employer and the works council a duty to "safeguard and promote the
untrammeled development of the personality of the employees of the es-
tablishment."' 56 This section of the Act, unlike all others, emphasizes a
concern for the interests of individual employees,' 57 and it has been
called the "Magna Carta" of the Works Constitution Act.158 The Fed-
eral Labor Court-Germany's highest court for questions of labor law-
has stated that this section of the Act implies a joint duty of both the
employer and works council to protect employee privacy against intru-
sion by modem information technology. 5 9 Taken together, these princi-
ples require the employer to inform the works council whenever the
employer plans to collect or use private information in a manner that
would affect an employee's constitutional right to develop his or her per-
150. In addition to the provisions discussed in this paragraph, see BetrVG §§ 87(1l)[6]
(codetermination in the introduction of technical monitoring systems, discussed infra text ac-
companying notes 179-205), 90(2) (notice to Works Council of plans to alter the technical
plant), 92(1) (notice of changes in manpower planning), 94(1) (veto right of Works Council
concerning staff questionnaires, discussed infra text accompanying notes 262-89), 95
(codetermination in setting hiring criteria), and 111 (notice of alterations in the employer's
business and hiring). See generally Michael Kort, Die Bedeutung moderner Informations.
techniken fzr den Persi'nlichkeitsschutz des Arbeitnehmers, 4 COMPUTER UND REcur 41, 41
(1988) [hereinafter Kort, Die Bedeutung].
151. BetrVG § 2(1); see also Michael Kort, Datenverarbeitung und Informationsrecht des
Betriebsrats, 4 COMPUTER UND RECHT 220, 221 (1988) [hereinafter Kort, Datenverarbeitung].
152. Kort, Datenverarbeitung, supra note 151, at 221.
153. BetrVG § 80(2).
154. Id; see also Judgment of Mar. 17, 1987, BAG, 54 BAGE 278, 286 (F.R-G.); Kort,
Datenverarbeitung, supra note 151, at 222.
155. BetrVG § 80(2).
156. Id § 75(2); see also Kort, Datenverarbeitung, supra note 151, at 221; SiMms supra
note 24, at 681.
157. See Kort, Die Bedeutung, supra note 150, at 42.
158. Wiesinger, Datenschutz, supra note 112, at 169, 201.
159. Judgment of Mar. 17, 1987, BAG, 54 BAGE 278, 287; see generally FITTING, supra
note 19, at 896.
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sonality freely,"6° particularly when the monitoring involves the intimate
and private details of a worker's life.61 The works council's powers in-
clude a right to veto (erzwingbares Mitbestimmungsrecht) all question-
naires given to employees or applicants. 162
The Works Constitution Act also guarantees employees almost un-
restricted access to their personnel files. 1 63 Unlike most other provisions
of the Act, the right to see one's files applies even in companies that have
no works council. 164 Employees may see their personnel files at any
time,165 or they may authorize a member of the works council to examine
files on their behalf.' 66 Works council members are bound to secrecy, 167
and representatives of the council have a duty not to disclose the contents
of a fie to third parties without the permission of the affected employee.
Employees need not request specific data; the employer must provide the
entire fie for inspection. 161 In addition, employees may see all informa-
tion under the employer's control, regardless of where or when the em-
ployer obtained it.' 69 The employer must tell employees how it uses the
information and how it has been collected.' 70 Employees may make cop-
ies of their files,'71 and they may insert their own comments.' 72 Finally,
the employer may not conceal or destroy any parts of the file without the
employee's consent while the employment agreement is in effect.173
Job applicants have less access to information under the Works
Constitution Act. The moment an employment contract takes effect, sec-
tion 83 of the Act provides a right to see all parts of the file, as it then
stands. But section 83 allows applicants to see their personnel file only
after they are hired, and the employer's duty not to alter or conceal parts
160. GG art. 2, § 1. See discussion supra, notes 81-94 and accompanying text; see also
Kort, Datenverarbeitung, supra note 151, at 224.
161. Kort, Datenverarbeitung, supra note 151, at 222.
162. BetrVG § 94(1); see also FrrING, supra note 19, at 1221. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 262-89 for a discussion of questionnaires.
163. BetrVG § 83. A personnel file is any collection of data concerning an employee, re-
gardless of its form. F=ITING, supra note 19, at 1015.
164. Wiesinger, Datenschutz, supra note 112, at 181.
165. BetrVG § 83; see also SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 998.
166. BetrVG § 83; see also SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 998.
167. BetrVG § 79; see also FrI-ING, supra note 19, at 1476; SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 998.
168. Judgment of Sept. 24, 1987, Arbeitsgericht Berlin [Labor Court of Berlin], 10 Ca.
159/87 (F.R.G.), reprinted in 4 COMPUTER UND RECHT 408 (1988).
169. WOLFGANG KUHLA, DATENSCHUTZ IM BEAMTEN- UND ARDEITSVERHALTNIS:
BEITR.AGE ZUR JURISTISCHEN INFORMATIK 50-51 (1983).
170. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 1005.
171. Id. at 999.
172. BetrVG § 83(2).
173. See KUHLA, supra note 169, at 51.
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of the fie also takes effect only after hiring. This does not mean, how-
ever, that applicants have no legal access to their files. Recall that the
Federal Data Protection Act places additional conditions on the em-
ployer's power to keep files on applicants. Under this law, if the em-
ployer maintains a file on an applicant, then the applicant may see it. 7 4
The right under the Works Constitution Act to examine one's own
personnel file becomes conditional when employment ends.1 75 The em-
ployer is not obligated to maintain files on former employees. 76 But, as
with unsuccessful applicants, if a file on a former employee does exist,
then the former employee may have access to it. 77 The Federal Data
Protection Act, 178 moreover, severely limits the employer's power to
maintain personnel files of former employees.
The Works Constitution Act of 1972 also explicitly regulates the
employer's use of technical systems for monitoring employees. New
methods of monitoring employee behavior and performance-such as
cameras, 179 electronic records of telephone calls,18° devices for measuring
assembly-line productivity, 81 computer programs that measure their op-
erators' efficiency,18 2 or even electronic punch-clocks " 4---pose new
problems."' Anonymous surveillance of German workers is now possi-
ble on a continuous basis without the need for human participation, 185
and employees could be monitored with essentially no choice in the mat-
ter. ' 6 Additionally, German workplaces have become some of the coun-
try's most fruitful places for collecting social data."8 7 The automatized
collection and processing of information about a company's employees
174. FrrrrNG, supra note 19, at 1016.
175. Judgment of Sept. 23, 1988, Landesarbeitsgericht Frankfurt [Land Labor Court of
Frankfurt], 15/2 Sa 1041/87 (F.R.G.), reprinted in 6 COMPUTER UND REcHT 207 (1990); see
also SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 999.
176. FrrrNG, supra note 19, at 1016.
177. See FrrrLNG, supra note 19, at 1016.
178. See SiMms, supra note 24, at 694.
179. FrrrNG, supra note 19, at 1079.
180. See Judgment of May 27, 1986, BAG, 52 BAGE 88, 88 (F.1.G.).
181. Judgment of Feb. 18, 1986, BAG, 51 BAGE 143, 144 (F.R.G.).
182. See FrTTING, supra note 19, at 1071, 1080.
183. See id at 1072.
184. For insight into American responses to these developments, see Mitch Betts, VDT
Monitoring Under Stress, COMPuTERWORLD, Jan. 1, 1991, at 1; Don't Pry, supra note 8; Moni-
toring Electronic Surveillance, supra note 7.
185. See Judgment of Sept 14, 1984, BAG, 46 BAGE 367, 375 (F.R.G.); Teske, supra note
84, at 672-73.
186. Judgment of Sept. 14, 1984, 46 BAGE at 375.
187. Teske, supra note 84, at 672.
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endangers the privacy rights of individual workers.' 8  These dangers in-
clude the possibility that the data may lose its proper context, leading to
errors and injustice; the risk of polarization between employer and em-
ployees; the danger of improper or unlawful use of the data by third par-
ties; and the easy combination of this data with data collected outside the
employment setting, which heightens the other dangers. 189
Under section 87 of the Works Constitution Act, a works council
must approve any new technical system that is capable' 90 of gathering
information on an employee's behavior or performance.' 91 In enacting
this law, the Bundestag wanted to protect workers' "personality do-
mains" (Persfnlichkeitsbereiche)92 and "personality rights" (Pers6n-
lichkeitsrechte)93 against the possibility of an employer's "Orwellian"' 94
technical surveillance. The Federal Labor Court stated three years after
the law was enacted that "encroachment into an employee's personal do-
main by the use of anonymous technological monitoring systems" is only
permissible with the works council's consent.' 95 The Works Constitution
Act, however, does not give individual workers the power to stop elec-
tronic surveillance at work without the help of the works council, 196 and
this assistance is not always forthcoming. 97
The works council's right under this law to reject new technical
means of surveillance is limited by the employer's purpose and the tech-
nical character of the monitoring system. If the employer only gathers
data that are unrelated to an employee's performance or behavior, the
action arguably does not require the works council's approval.198 Even if
the employer does not intend to use or analyze the data, the works coun-
188. Id. at 673.
189. Id.
190. Judgment of Sept. 9, 1975, BAG, 27 BAGE 256, 260-61 (F.R.G.); see also HORST
EHMANN, ARBEITSSCHUTZ UND MITBESTIMMUNG BEI NEUEN TECHNOLOGIEN 108 (1981).
191. BetrVG § 87(l)[6]; see also Judgment of Mar. 17, 1987, BAG, 54 BAGE 278, 287.
For a discussion of the terms "behavior" (Verhalten) and "performance" (Leistung), see
Michael Kort, EDV und betriebsverfassungsrechtliche Mitbestimmung, 3 COMPUTER UND
REcHT 300, 302-05 (1987).
192. Judgment of Sept. 9, 1975, BAG, 27 BAGE 256, 261; Judgment of Sept. 14, 1984,
BAG, 46 BAGE 367, 375.
193. Judgment of Sept. 14, 1984, 46 BAGE at 375; see also EHMANN, supra note 190, at
103.
194. EHMANN, supra note 190, at 103.
195. Judgment of Sept. 9, 1975, 27 BAGE at 261.
196. See Teske, supra note 84, at 674.
197. See, eg., Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, BAG, 53 BAGE 226, 228; see also infra text
accompanying notes 206-08.




cil must still approve of the collection. 199 The works council cannot ob-
ject, however, if the information is gathered in a way that does not
identify employees. 2" And the works council has no veto right if the
monitoring is not done through a technical system."° I For example, the
law does not cover the use of one-way mirrors' 2 or of time cards or
telephone logs that employees must fill out themselves. 0 3 Nonetheless, if
an employer intends to collect information manually and to analyze it
using a technical system, the works council first must approve the sys-
tem.' ° Finally, although the works council may not have the power to
prevent the use of information not relating to employee performance or
information gathered by a technical system, the employer must still give
the works council access to such information.20
The works council's power of codetermination often may be inade-
quate to oppose intrusions into employees' "personality domains." First,
collective rights rarely suffice to protect each individual: the works coun-
cil may in some cases decide to allow the installation of data-gathering
technology despite its adverse effects on some workers. °  Second, not all
employees are represented by the works councils. The Works Constitu-
tion Act does not seek to protect the interests of those excluded from the
statute's narrow definition of an "employee."20' Finally, the Works Con-
stitution Act's enforcement mechanism is ambiguous, relying mainly on
injunctive relief and small fines20 3 for the provisions concerning privacy.
That the Act only provides spotty protection does not render it inef-
fective. In fact, the Act's privacy provisions have proven sufficient to
help secure the Act's most important objectives: creating trust between
workers and management and avoiding labor disturbances.2 ' 9 And while
the Works Constitution Act leaves many holes uncovered, federal data
protection law fills in most of the gaps.
Codetermination and works councils arrived before data protection.
199. Judgment of Sept. 14, 1984, BAG, 46 BAGE 367, 376 (F.R.G.).
200. FrrriNG, supra note 19, at 1073; see also Judgment of Feb. 18, 1986, BAG, 51 BAGE
143, 148 (F.R.G.).
201. FrrrNG, supra note 19, at 1076.
202. Judgment of Aug. 31, 1988, 6 P 21.86 Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Federal Adminis-
trative Court] [BVerwG] (F.R.G.), reprinted in 7 COMPUTER UND RECHT 553 (1991).
203. FrrriNG, supra note 19, at 1077.
204. Id. at 1073, 1082.
205. Judgment of Mar. 17, 1987, BAG, 54 BAGE 278, 288.
206. See eg., Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, BAG, 53 BAGE 226, 228; see discussion infra
notes 222-35 and accompanying text.
207. BetrVG § 5.
208. Id § 121.
209. See Wiesinger, Betriebliche Mitbestimmung, supra note 145, at 202.
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These labor laws were never intended to provide a comprehensive system
of privacy protection for German workers. Privacy rights are only a
small part of the package. As the fight for privacy protection shifted to
other battle fields-data protection legislation and constitutional law-
labor law was relieved of much of its responsibility :for protecting work-
ers' privacy. The enumerated powers of the works councils nonetheless
remain as an important element in the system of laws that protect pri-
vacy in the German workplace.
D. The Intersection of Constitutional Privacy Doctrine, Data
Protection Law, and Codetermination
To be permissible under German law, an employer's use of an
employee's personal information must satisfy the requirements of all
three doctrines: constitutional privacy, data protection law, and, when
applicable, codetermination.21° In the hierarchy of laws, the constitu-
tional right of informational self-determination limits the Federal Data
Protection Act's permissible uses of private information in the work-
place.2 1 In the private workplace, the Federal Labor Court has found
the Federal Data Protection Act generally satisfies the constitutional
requirements.21 2
The two levels of privacy protection, however, are not always con-
gruent. For example, the Federal Data Protection Act does not regulate
private entities' collection of information, but the Basic Law does. So the
presence of video cameras trained on workers, even if the cameras are not
functioning, violates the employees' constitutional right to develop their
personalities freely.213 Similarly, eavesdropping on employees' work-re-
lated telephone conversations without informing them also violates their
personality rights.21 4 The Federal Constitutional Court called on
lawmakers to bring the 1977 Federal data protection legislation in line
with the new constitutional doctrine. The Census Act decision an-
210. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, 53 BAGE at 230.
211. Judgment of Mar. 9, 1988, BverfG, 78 BVerfGE 77, 84; Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, 53
BAGE at 233; see also Schwartz, supra note 97, at 698.
212. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, 53 BAGE at 233.
213. Judgment of July 25, 1988, Arbeitsgericht Dortmund [Labor Court of Dortmund], 6
Ca 1026/88, reprinted in 5 COMPUTER UND REcHT 715 (1989); but see Judgment of May 15,
1990, Strafgericht Miinchen [Criminal Court of Munich], 5 40 Al 666/89 (F.R.G.), reprinted
in 7 COMPUTER UND REcHT 417 (1991) (installation of video cameras trained on areas where
employees are not working in order to reduce theft serves a legitimate interest of the employer
and is therefore permissible).
214. Judgment of Nov. 23, 1988, Arbeitsgericht Berlin [Labor Court of Berlin], 6 Ca 335/
88 (F.R.G.), reprinted in 6 COMPUTER UND REcuT 132 (1990).
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nounced that legislators are "duty-bound" to adopt organizational and
procedural measures designed to safeguard individuals from any infringe-
ment of their right to personality.215 The 1990 revisions are a response to
this call for change.
The Works Constitution Act's protection of personal data, more-
over, is incomplete without the Data Protection Act and the subsequent
constitutional developments. The Federal Data Protection Act strength-
ens the role of works councils, since a works council's guaranteed access
to the employer's information216 includes any information necessary to
monitor compliance with data protection laws.217 Section 87 of the
Works Constitution Act does not create broad protections against misuse
of personal data, as does the Data Protection Act;218 section 87 merely
establishes limited protection of "personality rights" against intrusion by
"technical" surveillance. 2 1 9 Finally, other powers of the works council,
such as the right to disapprove employee questionnaires,2 0 are collective
rights, and the works council might approve measures that, while benefit-
ting most workers, intrude on the privacy interests of some. The Federal
Labor Court, however, has held that the works council cannot authorize
an employer to collect and manage information in violation of the appli-
cable data protection laws.22
A 1986 decision of the Federal Labor Court illustrates the overlap
of these doctrines and the potential unreliability of the works councils in
safeguarding employees' rights.' - In 1984 an employee in Mannheim
petitioned the local labor court223 for the erasure of information in his
personnel fie recording his gender, religion, marital status, military ser-
vice, primary education, vocational training, higher education, and lan-
guage skills. 24 The employer had collected the information by means of
a questionnaire, to which the company's works council had not ob-
215. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, BverfG, 65 BVerfGE 1, 44.
216. See BetrVG § 80(2).
217. Judgment of Mar. 17, 1987, BAG, 54 BAGE 278, 286-87; ,see also FrrrlNG, supra
note 19, at 994; Simrris, supra note 24, at 681; Bernd Beder, Betriebsrat und betrieblicher
Datenschutzbeauftragter. Zwei Funktionen fjir dieselbe Aufgabe? 6 COMPUTER UND REcHT
475, 475 (1990).
218. See BDSG § 1.
219. EHmANN, supra note 190, at 124.
220. BetrVG § 94(1).
221. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, BAG, 53 BAGE 226.
222. Id
223. The local labor court is the court of first instance for questions of labor law. Appeals
go to the appropriate Land labor court (Landesarbeitsgericht) and then, if necessary, to the
Federal Labor Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht).
224. Judgment of Aug. 10, 1984, Arbeitsgericht Mannheim [Mannheim Labor Court], 2
Ca. 20/84, reviewed in Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, BAG, 53 BAGE 226.
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jected.225 Since there had been no violation of the works council's power
to oppose questionnaires,226 the only remaining contested issue was
whether storage of the data violated either the Federal Data Protection
Act or the constitutional right to informational self-determination.227
The Court ordered the erasure of information xelating to religion
and military service.2 2 The prohibited data, the Court ruled, did not
meet the Federal Data Protection Act's requirement of being necessary
for maintaining a contractual relationship or quasi-contractual relation-
ship of trust, or to safeguard justifiable interests of the company.229 But
the Court permitted the collection, storage, and other uses of data con-
cerning gender, marital status, education, and language skills.230 The
Court reasoned that records of an employee's gender are necessary for
maintaining the employment relationship, since the employer is regularly
required to report to federal authorities the male and female proportions
of its workforce.231 The court did not address whether such information
could facilitate illegal gender discrimination.232 Information on marital
status is necessary, in the Court's view, for situations in which the em-
ployer must decide whom to lay off or transfer.233 Finally, information
on education, training, and language abilities bears directly on an em-
ployee's suitability for particular assignments.234 Since the employer's
collection of these data did not violate the Federal Data Protection Act,
the Court held that it also did not violate the Basic ]Law.235
The three doctrines of employee privacy have several broad excep-
tions. First, anonymity purifies intrusion. Information gathered in a
manner that does not associate the data with an identifiable individual
does not implicate any of the three primary employee privacy doctrines.
The works council has no veto power over new technical surveillance
225. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, 53 BAGE at 228, 231.
226. See BetrVG § 94(1); Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, 53 BAGE at 228, 231, 236.
227. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, 53 BAGE at 228, 230.
228. Id at 234-36.
229. I at 233; see also Old BDSG § 23, BDSG § 28.
230. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, 53 BAGE at 234-36.
231. Id. at 234.
232. German federal law prohibits gender discrimination in hiring and advancement. BGB
§ 61 Ia. For a descriptive study of gender discrimination in pre-unification Germany, see
Uschi Backes-Gellner & Bemd Frick, Discrimination in Employment in the Federal Republic
of Germany, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 105 (1989).
233. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, BAG, 53 BAGE 226, 234 (citing the federal Employment
Protection Act (Kiindigungsschutzgesetz), 1969 BGBI. 1 1317, 1978 BGBI. I 550 § 1(3)).
234. Id. at 235-36.
235. Id. at 233.
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systems that cannot identify individual workers3 6 or specific groups of
workers.237 The Federal Data Protection Act only regulates the use of
data that concern the "personal or material circumstances of an identi-
fied or identifiable natural person." 38 And the Census Act decision ap-
proved several proposed census questions that could not be used to
identify sources of the information collected.3 9 The Federal Constitu-
tional Court has since stated explicitly that the collection of statistical
data does not violate the subject's constitutional personality rights if ano-
nymity is preserved. 2'
Another notable weakness in Germany's entire privacy and data
protection scheme is that consent to disclose private information may
often be inferred from the act of disclosure, even in circumstances in
which the disclosing person would rather not provide the information
but feels compelled, usually by economic pressure, to do so. Consent
ratifies otherwise improper use of private information under the Federal
Data Protection Act,24 ' the Works Constitution Act,24 and the Census
Act decision (since consent is implicit in the concept of informational
self-determination).243 And while in many cases the consent must be
knowing,2' the law does not appear to require that it be truly voluntary.
The law does not address whether the pressure of the job search or an
employer's demands could make any consent less meaningful.
JIL. SPECIFIC ISSUES IN INFORMATION GATHERING
AND STORAGE
A. Personnel Files
Generally, an employer is free to keep whatever information it
wants in an employee's personnel file, provided that the information is
related to the employment relationship.245 The employer is not required
236. FrITiNG, supra note 19, at 1073; see also Judgment of Feb. 18, 1986, BAG, 51 BAGE
143, 146.
237. Judgment of Mar. 23, 1989, Arbeitsgericht Berlin [Labor Court of Berlin], 35 BVGa
1/89, reprinted in 6 COMPUTER UND RECHT 482 (1990).
238. BDSG § 3(1); see also BDSG §§ 3(7), 30; FrIrING, supra note 19, at 1020.
239. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, BVerfG, 65 BVerfGE 1, 52-53, 63, 65-66.
240. Judgment of Dec. 7, 1988, BVerfG, 79 BVerfGE 240, 242-43 (F.tRG.).
241. BDSG § 4(2).
242. See, ag., BetrVG §§ 87, 94(1).
243. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, BverfG, 65 BVerfGE 1.
244. For example, if an employer wishes to keep on file information concerning an unsuc-
cessful job applicant, the applicant must know of and consent to this. SiMrrls, supra note 24,
at 695-96.
245. FrrnING, supra note 19, at 1015.
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to maintain files on employees, 246 but if a file exists, it is subject to regula-
tion. Secret employee files are illegal.247 A personnel file may contain
any application materials, including resum6s, questionnaires, letters of
recommendation, certain medical test results, 248 and aptitude tests. The
file may also contain information relating to later development of the
employment relationship, such as wage or salary information, correspon-
dences, security information, limited medical reports, 249 and final disci-
plinary reports.250 The personnel file may not include reports prepared
by the firm's doctor to which the employer has no legal access.251 Alle-
gations of an employee's unsatisfactory performance or behavior that are
not substantiated at a formal hearing are also prohibited.252
The employer has a duty to prevent unauthorized third parties from
gaining access to personnel files.25a An employer does not escape this
duty when it hires another person or concern to manage the data.2"4 It is
unclear whether works council members may view these files without the
employee's consent.255 The employer also may not disclose information
from a personnel file to third parties without the employee's consent.
For instance, an employer may not give the information to another em-
ployer to whom the employee has applied for a position.256
B. Information Gathering in the Application Process
The use of personal data is only permissible when the information is
necessary to the party requesting it.257 In the pre-employment context,
this restricts the information an employer may request to what is relevant
to the prospective employment relationship. 258 The Federal Data Pro-
tection Act permits the processing of data as part of a "relationship of
trust. ' 25 9 During the application process, this generally allows employ-
ers to gather information that is necessary for choosing among several
246. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 997.
247. FrrTmNG, supra note 19, at 1016.
248. The use of medical tests is strictly limited. See infra text accompanying notes 290-
303.
249. See infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
250. FrrNG, supra note 19, at 1015; SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 997.
251. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 997; see infra text accompanying notes 292-94.
252. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 999.
253. Id at 998.
254. Kort, Datenverarbeitung, supra note 151, at 223.
255. Wiesinger, Betriebliche Mitbestimmung, supra note 145, at 212.
256. FrTTING, supra note 19, at 1017.
257. BDSG § 28; see also Wiesinger, Datenschutz, supra note 112, at 175.
258. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 95.
259. BDSG § 28.
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applicants for a particular position.26° Because data protection is consid-
ered so important, employers may not punish applicants or employees
who give false answers to illegal questions.261
1. Questionnaires and Standardized Questions
In companies regulated by the Works Constitution Act, the works
council has the right to veto all questionnaires and standardized ques-
tions presented to applicants and employees.262 This right does not,
however, grant control over how an employer uses the information col-
lected.263  And although the definition of a questionnaire might be
stretched to cover the employer's choice of criteria for hiring applicants
or promoting employees, 2e the Works Constitution Act does not govern
the collection of information from third-parties.265
But where the Works Constitution Act slumbers, the Federal Data
Protection Act is usually vigilant. Approval by a works council will not
validate questions that a data protection statute prohibits.2" The Fed-
eral Data Protection Act's principles of relevance and necessity addition-
ally restrict the permissible scope of questions asked of applicants by any
employer.2 67 Assuming consent by a works council, information that the
employer may always legally request includes the applicant's name, ad-
dress, phone number, gender, education and training, employment his-
tory, previous income levels, and language skills.268 Inquiries into an
applicant's free-time activities or parents' employment status are exam-
ples of irrelevant, and therefore illegal, questions.269 Violations may re-
sult in damage awards,2 0 but only for actual damages.271
Some kinds of information are conditionally available to the em-
ployer. Questions about an applicant's religion are forbidden unless the
applicant seeks work in a religious institution or hospital. 272 The em-
260. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 1004.
261. FIrrING, supra note 19, at 1223; see also Wiesinger, Datenschutz, supra note 112, at
177.
262. BetrYG § 94(1).
263. See Wiesinger, Betriebliche Mitbestimmung, supra note 145, at 207.
264. Id. at 209.
265. Id
266. FrrrING, supra note 19, at 1223.
267. BDSG § 28; see also SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 103.
268. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, BAG, 53 BAGE 226; SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 104.05,
1004.
269. FrrrING, supra note 19, at 1225.
270. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 103.
271. Wiesinger, Datenschutz, supra note 112, at 177.
272. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 105; Wiesinger, Datenschutz, supra note 112, at 176.
19921
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
ployer may inquire into an applicant's marital status and number of chil-
dren273 but not an applicant's intention to marry.274 The employer may
not ask whether an applicant is a member of a union or political party
unless the employer discloses at the same time that it is a member of a
particular employer association (Arbeitgeberverband) from which the ap-
plicant can expect a positive reaction to union membership.275
The employer may legitimately ask questions about current illnesses
and disabilities that could lead to foreseeable performance limitations or
dangers for the applicant or his or her co-workers.276 This wide range of
justifications for inquiring into an applicant's current illnesses or physical
disabilities invites doubt that any true prohibitions exist. But questions
about earlier illnesses with no present effects are limited because they
encroach into the applicant's private affairs, as do questions about latent
diseases.2 77 Such questions are permissible only when necessary to pro-
tect the justifiable interests of the employer or other employees.278
AIDS is treated like any other disease. If an applicant shows symp-
toms of AIDS, the employer may ask about the illness. As one commen-
tator explains this rule's justification, "with today's understanding of the
disease, the employer can soon expect the employee to become incapable
of working., 279 If no manifestations of the disease are apparent, how-
ever, asking applicants whether they carry the HIV virus is only permis-
sible when the job sought could place the applicants in a position to
infect others, such as in a health care setting.280 After symptoms appear,
asking whether an employee has AIDS may be considered "necessary to
safeguard justifiable interests of the company" under the Federal Data
Protection Act 28 1 and, in one commentator's view, fulfills a "compelling
273. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, 53 BAGE at 234; SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 1004; Frr-
TING, supra note 19, at 1224.
274. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 104.
275. FrrrNG, supra note 19, at 1224; SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 105; Wiesinger, Daten-
schutz, supra note 112, at 176.
276. See Gesetz zur Sicherung der Eingliederung Schwerbehinderter in Arbeit, Beruf und
Gesellschaft-Schwerbehindertengesetz (Federal Disabilities Law) [SchwbG], 1986 BUBI I
1421; see also Wiesinger, Datenschutz, supra note 112, at 176; SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 105-
06; FrTTNG, supra note 19, at 1223.
In the United States, the new Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12112(c)(4)(West Supp. 1991), only permits employers to ask applicants about abilities to
perform specific jobs.
277. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 105; Wiesinger, Datenschutz, supra note 112, at 176.
278. FITTING, supra note 19, at 1223; SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 105.
279. FTTING, supra note 19, at 1225.
280. Id.
281. BDSG( § 28(1)2.
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public interest" under the Census Act doctrine.28 2
Some questions about pregnancy are permissible. The employer's
only legitimate interest in knowing about an applicant's pregnancy de-
rives from the employer's responsibilities under Germany's Mother Pro-
tection Act.2 3 If an applicant knows that she is pregnant, and the
position sought is regulated by the Act,2 4 she must inform the em-
ployer.28 5 She may wait until she is certain about the pregnancy before
she must disclose; she need not tell the employer about a mere hunch.28 6
The employer, including any doctors it uses for medical testing of appli-
cants, may not ask about a woman's menstruation or her use of birth
control.287
Employers may ask for financial data from applicants for sensitive
positions of financial responsibility, such as firm managers or bank tell-
ers.28 8 Moreover, applicants must volunteer to prospective employers




Unlike American employers, 2 ° German employers may require pre-
employment medical screening. As several commentators have ex-
plained, applicants need not submit to medical testing, but they should
not expect to get the job if they do not.291
While many employees or applicants may submit to medical testing
against their will, the use of the resulting information is carefully re-
stricted. The examining doctor's duty of confidentiality is not dimin-
ished.292 The doctor may not tell the employer the details of his findings,
282. See FrrrNG, supra note 19, at 1225.
283. Gesetz zum Schutze der erwerbstitigen Mutter-Mutter Schutzgesetz [Mother Pro-
tection Act] [MuSchG], 1968 BGBI. I 315.
284. See MuSchG §§ 4 (heavy physical labor, long hours, or work with dangerous sub-
stances or diseases), 8 (night and weekend work). Cf International Union, et al. v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (holding that Title VII, as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, forbids sex-specific fetal protection policies).
285. MuSchG § 5(1); See also SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 105.
286. ScHAUB, supra note 22, at 105.
287. Id
288. ScHAun, supra note 22, at 106.
289. Id.
290. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(c)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
291. FrriNG, supra note 19, at 1226; Wiesinger, Datenschutz, supra note 112, at 177. See
supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text for a general discussion of consent.
292. Gesetz iiber Betriebsirzte, Sicherheitsingenieure und andere Fachkri~fe fur Arbeits-
sicherheit § 8(l), 1973 BGBI. I 965; FrrrING, supra note 19, at 1016.
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including any diagnoses.29 3 The duty of confidentiality, however, does
not prohibit the doctor from commenting to the employer on the appli-
cant's suitability for employment.294 The employer bears the cost of the
examination.2 95 And the applicant may see the results of the exam upon
request.
296
An employee may refuse to submit to genetic testing, and whether
an employer may require genetic testing of a job applicant is doubtful.297
Still, an applicant may consent to genetic testing that is limited to infor-
mation that is relevant to the employment sought.298
3. Psychological Screening
In light of the constitutional imperative that human dignity not be
offended,299 psychological testing of employees would be illegal in most
circumstances. One commentator believes that requiring psychological
screening is "dubious" even when the applicant consents. 30 This com-
mentator argues that such screening, according to the principle of neces-
sity, is permissible only when the job to be filled holds particularly high
responsibility, the scope of the testing and questioning is limited to col-
lecting information that is relevant to the employment contract, and the
applicant consents. 30 1 Like medical screening, psychological testing car-
ries a duty of confidentiality, and the examining person may only com-
ment to the employer on the applicant's suitability fbr employment.302
Tests that seek to produce an objective intelligence quotient are imper-
missible under all circumstances.30 3
IV. CONCLUSION
German privacy law is relatively new, essentially originating barely
two decades ago. Codetermination has a long history in Germany, but
the privacy provisions of the Codetermination Act first appeared only in
1972. Data protection legislation, the primary source of legal protection
for personal information, originated at roughly the same time. And the
293. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 96.
294. Ia
295. Id
296. FrrriNG, supra note 19, at 1226.
297. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 96.
298. Id.
299. GG art. 1(1).
300. SCHAUB, supra note 22, at 95.
301. Id.




constitutional doctrine of informational self-determination grew out of
the jurisprudence of the same era. Memories of the Third Reich-at
least as they influenced the formulation of the Basic Law-contemporary
reaction to East German authoritarianism, and the growth of privacy
rights in other countries were also significant motivating factors.' 4 But
the computer revolution was clearly the catalyst.30 5
German privacy law, like the country itself, is in transition. The
new Federal Republic is struggling simultaneously with the challenges of
reunification and working to effect European political and economic inte-
gration. The former East German Ldnder must accommodate and de-
velop a new legal system. And as social conditions change, the courts
may recognize a shift in the balance of personal and public interests re-
lated to certain kinds of information. The dynamics of the employer-
employee relationship will ensure that the law of privacy in the work-
place will continue to evolve. And as Americans work to fashion legisla-
tive responses to the computer revolution on this side of the Atlantic, we
will undoubtedly find the German example to be a useful guide.
304. See SIMrIs, supra note 24, at 56-57.
305. See Bundesdatenschutzgesetz mit Verordnungen, supra note 34, at 9; SIMrrls, supra
note 24, at 55.
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